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Triumph o f Humań Experience
KRISTOF K.P. VANHOUTTE 
{Romę)
Two stories lie at the base o f  this paper, the m ythical story o f  Sisyphus (especially 
as interpreted by A lbert Camus) and the biblical story o f  Jo b 1. These two well 
known stories m ay not seem at first glance to have anything specific in common, 
and when viewed in the context o f  the potentially redem ptive pow er o f  hum or1 2, 
even less so. It would in fact be almost im proper to cali either o f  these texts3 
‘hum orous’, let alone ‘funny’. However, given the w ide rangę o f  possible 
meanings for the concept o f  ‘hum or’, limiting that term  to the m eaning o f  ‘being 
hum orous’, ‘being funny’ or just ‘com ic’ is not only unnecessarily lim iting and 
restrictive, it probably makes it impossible for hum or to be seen as having any 
redemptive power at all4.
1 This article develops a paper entitled “The Laughing Sisyphus” that was originally presented at 
the International Conference “DEUS R dens - The Redemptive Power of Humor in Religion” held 
on 20-21April 2009 at the University o f Antwerp (Belgium). I would like to acknowledge the 
helpful critique madę by Professor Lydia Amir and the encouragement received ffom Dr. Jessica 
Milner Davis while I was working on this study. I can only express great gratitude for their help 
and encouragements.
2 As mentioned above, this was the theme of the conference.
3 I use the Italian version of the Bibie (La Bibbia di Gerusalemme 2002:18th edition) and the text of 
Camus’ essay given in The Myth of Sisyphus - and Other Essays, New York: Vintage Books, 
1959, throughout. For references to ancient literaturę I have used Italian versions available to me, 
giving chapter and verse rather than page references, so that the exact phrases can be found in 
other versions and different translations if desired.
4 The etymology of the word humor is generally accepted as showing that the contemporary me­
aning of the word, that is, anything that is humorous, is of recent datę. Originally the word humor
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W hat follows, therefore, is based on the w ider view o f  the m eaning o f  hum or which 
embraces the feeling o f  happy am usem ent as well as the perception o f  the 
ridiculous, which will allow m e to treat the them e o f  (the absurdity of) suffering 
which lies at the heart o f  both stories. Using this meaning, I will attempt to show 
how Camus m ight have come to consider Sisyphus as a ‘happy’ m an (although he 
h im self did not offer any definition regarding the naturę o f  this happiness), and 
then I will try to dem onstrate why Sisyphus m ight also be considered capable of 
laughter in his happiness.
Despite the fact that the story o f  Sisyphus and the story o f  Job come from 
com pletely different traditions* 5.1 will com pare S isyphus’ situation with that o f  Job 
and try to show that, in a certain sense, both Job and Sisyphus confront extreme 
forms o f  suffering in a fundamentally absurd situation that for both m en implies a 
simple choice between victory or defeat. In these circumstances, it seems to me, 
both figures can conąuer the absurdity o f  their situation only by hum or6. I must 
clarify from the outset that m y reading o f  The Book o f  Job is a Catholic (Christian) 
o n e7 and m y com m entary should be interpreted accordingly.
was linked to the ‘moisture’ (humid) orthe fluids of animal bodies (as such, ‘humor’ was a tempe­
rament or fixed type of behaviour that was linked to relative imbalance in the four bodily fluids eg 
‘ill-humor’ or bad temper).Only in the 19th century did the word humor gain its present significa- 
tion of anything amusing and funny. Some authors are convinced the word humor is also etymolo- 
gically linked to the word ‘humus’ (see Stephen W. Gilbert 1996, for example). This idea, ho- 
wever, is nowhere to be found in standard etymological dictionaries and Gilbert himself accepts it 
is an elusive connection.
5 One an ancient myth from the Greek classical tradition and the other an ancient text from the Je- 
wish tradition.
6 Some authors, whether writing from a Christian position or not, see The Book of Job as a ‘comical’ 
book. William Whedbee, for example, has argued that it contains at least two fundamental featu- 
res of comedy: the perception of incongruity and the basie plot linę in which all leads to a happy 
ending. Whedbee cites the playwright Christopher Fry as claiming that The Book of Job is “the 
great reservoir o f comedy” (Whedbee 1977: 32).
7 O f course Job is not principally a Catholic-Christian ‘figurę’, but my reading can be considered as 
lying within the Christian tradition of Job interpretations, starting with the Church Father, Grego- 
rius the Great. It follows that on certain points my reading of this Bibie text might be seen by some 
readers (from a Jewish background, for example) as ‘doubtful’. Flowever, claiming exclusivity in 
the interpretation of archetypal ‘figures’ like Job, as is unfortunately sometimes done in the name 
of narrow scholarship, is unnecessarily restrictive and risks a pedantic form of scholarship.
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This way o f  considering hum or does not easily accord w ith standard theories o f 
humor and laughter8. These, such as the Superiority Theory, the Incongruity 
Theory or the Release Theory, consider hum or as deriving from life in its ‘norm al’ 
and ‘generał’ aspects, whereas here I am considering hum an life in its most 
‘ab-normaT or ambi *uous situations, in which generalist theories are less likely to 
be relevant. M y way o f  considering hum or thus sees hum or as a possible response 
to one’s consideration o f  one’s proper or ideał life and to the freąuent contours o f 
ambiguity taken by this same life. I am  considering hum or as it can occur as an 
exceptional human response to suffering; hum or as a sign o f  utter acceptance o f  life 
as it is in all its forms, including the m ost am biguous and ‘self-threatening’ 
situations, an acceptance without any illusions. As such, we shall see that the 
happiness o f  Sisyphus, as im agined by Camus, cannot be regarded as simple or 
‘norm al’ happiness. It is an extraordinary kind o f  happiness that has (in the realm  o f 
cognition) come to term s with the utter and com plete absence o f  (normal) 
happiness. The same goes for the kind o f  laughter I propose as conceivable and 
appropriate in such circumstances.
As M orreall and other theorists have pointed out, not all forms o f  laughter go 
naturally together with happiness and vice versa. There is a kind o f  laughter (black 
or sarcastic) that does not bring any form o f  happiness and the same is true for 
happiness in its tum. Indeed, ju st being happy does not necessarily m ean that one 
must laugh (I notę in passing that happiness and being happ> are not definitionally 
exactl> the same thing). In the extreme form o f  laughter and happiness w ith w hich I 
am concemed, absurd laughter m ay be iruced w ith absurd happiness, because, I 
would argue, the happiness brought forth by the conscious, cognitive awareness o f  
an absolute lack o f  happiness paradoxically can give rise to a laughter bom  o f  the 
absolute absence o f  anything to laugh at. Such a form o f  laughter can occur 
precisely because there is absolutely nothing left to laugh.
Interestingly, this is the laughter that expresses the extrem e form o f  B ergson’s 
view in his theory o f  laughter, Laughter: An Essay on the meaning o f  the Comic,
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8 John Morreall’s valuable discussion of these and other theories in his book Taking Laughter Se- 
riously (especially chapters 2, 3 and 4) treats each theory and its ‘flaws’, concluding that not all 
forms of humor and laughter can (or should) be classiried this way (Morreall 1983:4-58). I do not 
propose an all-embracing new theory of humor; in fact, dealing only with the borderlines o f what 




that all laughter requires “an[a]esthesia o f  the heart” (Bergson 1911: 3). It is the 
laughter o f  complete indifference or lack o f  emotion (Bergson 1911: 4)9. Thus I 
consider that C am us’ gift o f  happiness to Sisyphus based on this ąuality o f 
acceptance and indiflerence to his lot m ay logically be in complete accord with my 
supposition that laughter m ight aceom pany his happiness, the two expenences 
being considered alm ost one and the same. This is in fact a happy laughter, or morę 
precisely laughter o f  happiness despite extreme circumstances, and, as I will 
attem pt to dem onstrate, it is this response which links Sisyphus w ith Job.
1. The myth of sisyphus
Ever sińce Hom er in The Odyssey described the situational predicam ent o f 
Sisyphus (Hom er 2U0t>: w . 593-599)10, m any stories have been advanced to 
explain why Sisyphus rece i\ed  the punishm ent he did. Some traditions hołd that 
Sisyphus informed on Zeus who had kidnapped a beautiful girl. According to this 
tradition Sisyphus told the father (Asopo) o f  the girl (Egina) that Zeus had taken 
her. (Apollodoro 1998:1,9,3; Pausania2005: II, 5, l).O th er traditions tell the story 
that Sisyphus escaped from the underworld using cunning and highly astute 
planning. (Teognide 1989: I, w .  702-713; Sophocles 2003: 625; Alcaeus 1999: 
fragm ent 38). Still others tell o f  a Sisyphus who hated his brother so much that in 
order to fulfill an oracie predicting his bro ther’s death, he fathered a child on his 
b ro ther’s daughter so that the child from the union (as foretold by the oracie) could 
kill the hated b ro ther W hen this daughter o f  S isyphus’ brother, however, found out 
what the oracie had foretold, she killed all her offspring (Igmo 1998: 60). Some 
later sources also refer to Sisyphus, but as these later readings o f  the myth are 
considered to be mere re-interpretations, they are o f  no particulai .nterest to this
9 Such laughter is quite similar to Milan Kundera’s laughter, in the view of Guido Vanheeswijck 
(Vanheeswijck 1993: 150): “Here it is described as a wisdom-laughter which goes against (nor- 
mal) culture; the laughter that in an unreserved way acknowledges the groundlessness of all 
striving and the lightness o f our existence” (my translation).
10 See Homer, The Odyssey (Arlington: Richer Resource Publications, 2006) XI, w . 593-599: “And 
then, in his painful torment, I saw Sisyphus striving with both hands to raise a massive rock. He’d 
brace his arms and feet, then strain to push it uphill to the top. But just as he was going to get that 
stone across the crest, its overpowering weight would make it change direction. The cruel rock 
would roli back down again onto the plain. Then he’d strain once morę to push it up the slope. His 
limbs dripping sweat, and dust rosę from his head”.
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paper' 1. W hatever the given reasons for the punishm ent o f  Sisyphus, all traditions 
agree that he received the famous punishm ent o f  having for all eternity to push a 
huge rock up a m ountainside without ever quite achieving the task, because the 
rock repeatedly falls back down the slope whenever the top is w ithin reach.
While my initial hesitation about the essential ‘hum orouslessness’ o f  this myth 
needs once again to be acknowledged, it is im portant to notę that at least one 
‘interpretation’1 2 o f  this myth can be found that dwells upon the hum or innate in 
this mechanical, repetitious and unrewarding task, nam ely its re-visitation by 
Albert C am us’ in his essay, The M yth o f  Sisyphus. It is only in the finał part o f  this 
essay that we find four pages explicitly dedicated to the topie. Here first o f  all we 
should notę that all characteristics o f  the ancient versions o f  the m yth are present, 
although the reason for Sisyphus’ punishm ent is left open for speculation. The 
naturę o f  his punishm ent however is identical: constrained for all eternity to push a 
huge rock up a mountain without ever m akiug it to the top. There is, however, a 
smali change present in C am us’ text, a very smali one and alm ost unnoticeable, 
seemingly added as an afterthought at the end o f  the last sentence. The linę runs: “il 
faut imaginer Sisyphe hcuieux” (“one m ust im agine Sisyphus happy”) (Camus 
1959: 91).
I believe it js neither impossible nor illogical to add that one should therefore 
also imagine Sisyphus laughing. The justification for this is that the Sisyphus 
described by Camus finds h im self in an ‘em otionless’ (thus happy) State and 
therefore is fully capable o f  the kind o f  pure intellectual response to absurdity and 
the inversion o f  reason which Bergson saw as releasing the kind o f  laughter which 
has emotion as its enemy. Just like the absurd, laughter cannot exist beyond the pale 
o f what is strictly human. But, as already noted, its release usually occurs in the 
absence o f  feeling or an ‘an[a]esthesia o f  the heart’. Sometim es this simply debars 
empathy with the targets o f  the laughter, but the m atter is morę profound than that. 
In fact, Bergson wrote:
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11 One of the morę interesting re-interpretations is found in a Renaissance text that tells the story of a 
Sisyphus ‘hotel-manager’ who kept on murdering his guests by stoning them to death. This would 
seem to justify why this Sisyphus received his own famous punishment (see Giovanni dei Bonsi- 
gnori, Ovidiu Methamorphoseos vulgare, printed in Venice by Zoane Rosso for Lucantonio Zonta 
on MCCCCLXXXXVII a de X del mese di Aprile, Libro IV, Capitolo XXXI, De Sisypho).
12 It isdifficult to cali Camus’ re-visitation of this ancient Greek myth an ‘interpretation’, as hedoes 
not in fact offer a fully-fledged interpretation of the myth. He interprets Sisyphus’ punishment wi­
thout mentioning what Sisyphus did to deserve it and does not give any new explanations beyond 
those that can be found in the ancient writings on Sisyphus.
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It seems as though the comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the 
surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled. Indifference is its natural environment, for 
laughter has no greater foe than emotion.... [WJhcreas highly emotional souls, in tune and unison 
with life, in whom every event would be sentimentally prolonged and re-echoed, would neither 
know nor understand laughter. (Bergson 1911:4)
I shall return to  th is  ex tension  to  C am us’ w ords later, but clearly the Sisyphus 
described by Camus finds him self in a very similar ‘em otionless’ State to  that 
describcd by Bergson.
2. T h e  lau g h in g  s isyphus
C am us’ re-visitation o f  the myth o f  Sisyphus is an essay o f  a very peculiar naturę, 
as is dem onstrated by its reception by the reading public. It took 13 years before the 
text was translated into English and then it was only after translations o f both 
/ ’Etranger and La Peste, two o f  his m ost famous novels, had created a certain 
reputation for the author in the English-speaking world. Even so, reviews o f  The 
Myth o f  Sisyphus were not very positive. The New Yorker (April 14, 1956, 174) 
wrote that “it is all very high powered and confusing” , while according to the Yale 
Review (Spring 1956,46), “Cam us has an ‘lntcrcsting’ mind, one that momentarily 
attracts because o f  its penchant for expressing epigram matically lucid reasons for 
holding im probable beliefs” . Grudging admiration came from Saturday Review 
(Oct. 8, 1955, 14) whose review er wrote that “ it is a difficult meal o f  life, and 
m aybe too narrow and thwarting a one, but it is also one that one cannot help but 
adm ire” . There is no doubt that C am us’ ideas are challenging and invoke 
contem plation o f  extrem e positions in life. I am not concem ed here to interpret, 
however, but to comment upon certa: i aspects o f  this essay. This is not an attempt 
to write on Camus, but an attem pt to extrapolate from his text the possible reasons 
for w hy Camus could have im agined Sisyphus as happy.
As already m entioned, only a very smali section o f  the essay is dedicated to the 
m ythological figurę o f  Sisyphus. These last four pages come after an intriguing 
philosophical reflection about com m itting or not committing suicide in a highly 
‘hostile’ and frustrating world. Camus, in fact, describes his essay as a text that 
deals “with an absurd sensitivity” (Camus 1959: 2) and he elaborates that “the 
absurd ..., is considered in this essay as a starting point” (Camus 1959: 2). He 
explains that for him  the absurd is the ‘m om ent’ o f  “confrontation between the 
hum an need and the unreasonable silence o f  the w orld” (Camus 1959: 21). 
Furtherm ore, in these crucial four pages, Camus does not in any way offer a
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possible interpretation o f  the w hole m yth but only o f  S isyphus’ punishm ent and 
suffering. So it seems improbable, even incredible, that he w ould have tried to 
imagine Sisyphus happy, even (as I w ould add) laughing (a happy laugh because o f  
the formal equivalence between happiness and laughter m the condition o f  
absurdity). But he did, leaving us 10 try to understand how this could be.
Although Camus never exactly m entions what ‘being happy’ means, I believe 
explanation is provided by the context, that is, by the situation in which we find 
Sisyphus placed -  for all eternity. It is precisel} the im possibility o f  any possible 
futurę happiness that enables Camus to start re-claim ing happiness for his hero. I f  
the register established by all our ‘norm aP behavior or experience applies to the 
futurę, then life has to continue to change and all ‘norm al’ and past pattem s will 
return and recur. IIowever, under this new  constellation o f  govem ing factors for 
Sisyphus, change is ruled out: hoping for futurę absence or presence is no longer 
applicable and the present is all. How then does the hero respond?
In order to answer these ąuestions, it is necessary first to look at the other 
‘absurd’ characters present in this text. Since Sisyphus is portrayed as an ‘absurd 
hero’ (Camus 1959: 89), the essential charactenstics o f  the ‘lesser’ absurd heroes 
must also be present in Sisyphus. Following this linę o f  thought, it is possible to 
individuate four fundamental and essential characteristics indicatedby Camus that 
would render Sisyphus able to be happy and, even, as I suggest, to laugh. These 
four characteristics can be grouped into two pairs.
A first ąuality seemingly fundamental for S isyphus’ ability to be happy and 
laugh is what could be called the characteristic o f  acceptance. But this is not iust 
any form o f  acceptance and for that reason a second characteristic should be 
addressed at once; that o f  consciousness. In fact, both these ąualities are present in 
all o f  the other absurd heroes found in the essay: Don Juan (Camus 1959: 51 -57), 
the conąueror (Camus 1959: 62-67), the traveler (Camus 1959: 59), the actor 
(Camus 1959: 57-62) and the true artistic creator (Camus 1959; 69-77).
All these m inor characters are fully conscious o f  theii life (-style) and conscious 
of(i.e. they ‘know ’asC am u sp u tso n v ario u s occasions), the ‘dangers’and Tim its’ 
o f  their lives and enterprises. At the same time, however, they fully accept their 
proper ‘lim itations’, which amounts to a third characteristic ąualifying the first 
two. So, if  valid for the ‘lesser’ heroes, these ąualities will also hołd for Sisyphus, 
the true hero o f  w hat Cam us views as the absurdity o f  life. Thus we can say that for 
Sisyphus to be able to be happy he has to be conscious o f  his own life and situation 
but at the same time able to accept his own limits. Sisyphus m ust “accept life




without appeal” (Cam us 1959: 75) 3, or in other words, he has to be capable of 
reasoning lucidly while noting his proper lim its13 4 (Camus 1959: 36).
Beside these first two fundamental characteristics and their qualifier there is a 
second pair. Being conscious o f  one’s proper life and accepting its limits is not 
sufficient sińce Sisyphus does not just have to “accept life without appeal” , he must 
also, according to Camus, be “deprived o f  [all] hope” (Camus 1959: 67). This 
being “deprived o f  all hope” is im portant not only for Sisyphus’ ability to be happy 
or to laugh, but also for C am us’ philosophy in generał. In fact, it is the fundamental 
aspect that, according to Camus himself, distinguishes his philosophy from 
existentialism. W hat all existential philosophies suggest, when confronted with 
the absurd is, according to Camus, escape (Camus 1959: 24).15 But in suggesting 
escape, they also keep their ‘belief’ in hope and ultimately “want to be cured” (Camus 
1959; 29). According to Camus, this is nothing morę than “philosophical suicide” 
(Camus 1959: 31), and in his view, accepting the deprivation o f hope is key.
Such ‘deprivauon is not how ever to be identified with despair (Camus 1959: 
67). N o-one can be happy or laughing at the same tim e as despairing. In tact, we 
can therefore see that probably the most im portant characteristic for why Sisyphus 
is able to laugh is one which alm ost naturally emerges from the absence o f  all hope: 
it is revolt. W ithout any hope o f  cure or salvation, Sisyphus must nevertheless 
consistently be dissatisfied with and reject his condition, although without any 
form o f  unrest or rebellion (Cam us 1959: 23)16. A lthough this characteristic o f 
‘m ental revolt’ m ight seem at first to be in contradiction o f  the characteristic o f 
acceptance, this is not the case. Despite the smallness o f  the difference between the
13 Interesting confirmation ofthis insight comes from another contemporary reading ofthemyth of 
Sisyphus, also outside the philosophical sphere. In Sisyphus. The OldStone A New Way, A Jun 
gian Approach to Midlife Crisis, Verena Kast confirms that “for a myth to endure, both the collec- 
tive and individual must be able to identify with it. Thus it must express an essential human condi­
tion. . ,.[i]t must illuminate some fundamental life experience.” She goes on to tell the story of an 
old lady who was able to accept in the end that “in the etemal repetition she [could] perceive....that 
she is on intimate terms with life”(Kast 1991: 18; 26).
14 The fact that for Sisyphus to be happy he must both ‘accept life without appeal’ and ‘reason luci­
dly, noting his proper limits’ re-confirms the connection with laughter. As Bergson said, for a per­
son to be able to laugh, they must have a thoroughly calm and unruffled soul (Bergson 1911:4).
15 Camus adds here: “Through an odd reasoning, starting out from the absurd over the ruins of re­
ason, in a closed universe limited to the human, they deify what crushes them and find reason to 
hope in what impoverishes them”.
16 Again, these two aspects (being deprived of all hope and revolt) underline the addition o f ‘laughte- 
r’ in its Bergsonian interpretation.
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characteristic o f  ‘m ental rev o lt’ and the characteriotic o f  acceptance, the 
distinction is nonetheless fundamental. The ąuality o f  revolt is in fact strictly 
related to the situation in which one finds oneself, whereas the characteristic o f  
acceptance is related only to one’s personal limitations. Thus Sisyphus has to 
accept himself, especially his own personal limitations, and he has to accept them  
com pletely (that is, he has to accept that his strength is what it is and that pushing 
the rock up the hill will strain him  to his limits ■ Nevertheless, he m ust revolt 
against the situation in which he finds h im self to com pelled to perform  the task, a 
situation against which he cannot actively protest, nor hołd any hope that anything 
will or even should change.
We can thus conclude that Sisyphus is happy and even able to laugh because o f 
these four essential and fundamental characteristics w hich are sim ultaneously 
present in his experience o f  life: consciousness, acceptance, deprivation o f  hope 
and mental rev o lt\ For Sis>phus to be able to laugh, according to A lbert Camus, 
he needs to be conscious o f  his own life-(style) and limitations, and these same 
limitations need to be accepted in fuli. On the other hand he needs to lack any form 
o f  hope without being desperate, that is, he needs to revolt against his present 
condition. He needs to revolt against the situation he finds h im self in. For others to 
be able to laugh and be happy in an absurd situation, they, like Sisyphus, w ill need 
to possess these same foui fundamental characteristics.
3. T h e  b o o k  o f  jo b
It seems justifiable to observe that, whereas C am us’ text treats the absurd The 
Book o f  Job seems to be absurd17 8. C enainly it is quite unrealistic: in fact God is
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17 To clarify these essential conditions (becausc accepting one’s limitations is intended beyond the 
vaeue sense that holds for everybody), it is helpful to tum to Camus’ desci iption of another absurd 
character, Don Juan. Don Juan is, for Camus, not the completely romantic lover always in pursuit 
o f a better experience; he is simply the “ordinary seducer”, the “sexual athlete” (Camus 1959: 53) 
who only wants quantity and numbers. But Don Juan knows this and that is why he laughs when 
one of his many conquests says that finally he has been given love. He has not finally been “given 
love”, but simply sex ‘once morę’ and he knows it: he is conscious of his limitations and accepts 
them. The same goes also for the traveler-figure discussed by Camus. The traveler has to travel, he 
will never find rest; but he knows this, and as a ‘true’ traveler (not just a once-in-while traveler), he 
accepts that he will always have to travel.
18 The terminology of James A. Wharton who wrote, “Particularly among modem people who dis- 
miss both the quest for God and the quest for some larger meaning in human life as absurd, [this
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represented as having a nice chat with the Satan, asking him where he has been and 
w hat he has done. But, even morę absurd seems to be the fact that God accepts 
Satan’s reąuest to Him. One could even think, as Carl Gustav Jung seems to have 
done, that God becomes unsure o f  Job’s faithfulness because He is influenced by 
Satan, (Jung 1984: 19-20). Be that as k may, it is striking how n this narrative God 
sim ply hands over to Satan all that is dearly beloved b> Job so that he can destroy it, 
in order to prove in the end that He, God, is right as usual, and Job will continue to 
revere H im 19.
It is not however the aim o f  this paper to judge whether The Book ofJob is absurd 
or not. W hat is important is that there is a strong elem ent o f the absurd present in 
this ancient Jewish text (whether or not we v, sh it to be there is a completely 
different issue)20. Its presence points immediately to some convergence between 
Sisyphus’s situation and that o f  Job’s. Just like Sisyphus, Job is locked in an absurd 
situation beyond his control. I ike Sisyphus again, Job seems to be be ng punished 
for something unclear and his punishm ent seems no less harsh than the one 
received by Sisyphus. Job looses all his wealth, his family and in the end even his 
health. Is it then possible to imagine, as we were able to do with Sisyphus, that Job 
m ight also attain a State o f  happiness and laughter?
Surpnsingly enough, all four characteristics present in C am us’ text and required 
to enable Sisyphus to be supposed as happy and laughing even in his absurd 
condition, are in fact present in the story o f  Job, and three o f  them  even appear in a 
very sim ilar manner. Regarding the first couple (acceptance and consc.ousness), 
we can without difficulty discem  that Job is perfectly conscious o f  1 is life situation 
and that he wholly accepts his limitations. The first time Job is confronted with his 
‘friends* referring to his precarious situation he expresses bitter complaint about 
his present condit.on: “Why give light to a m an o f  grief? W hy give life to those 
bitter o f  he art, who long for a death that never comes and hunt for it m orę than for
book is nothing inore than] the absurd ‘drama’ ofJob. Job has accused God of being a cosmic bully 
who cares nothing at all about human notions ofjustice and righteousness” (Wharton 1999: 157).
19 This also seems to be the tenor of Robert Frost’s re-visitation of The Book ofJob  in A M asąueof 
Reason. According to Frost, God explains his reasons for ‘torturmg’ Job with the followmg 
words: “I’m going to tell Job why I tortured him, and trust it won’t be adding to the torturę. I was 
just showing off to the Devil, Job Uf’ (Frost 2002: 484).
20 It is not important whether one is rehgious or not in order to see the absurd aspect to The Book o f  
Job. As mentioned above, both Wharton and Robert Frost easily connect the story with the same 
sense of absurdity wmch is felt by the religious. Isn’t Job himself capable of being seen as the per- 
sonification of all religious people when confronted with an acknowledged absurdity?
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Duried treasure?” He continues, “W hy give light to one who does not see his way, 
whom God shuts in all alone? My only food is sighs, and my groans pour out like 
water. W hatever I fear comes true, w hatever I dread befalls me. For me. there is no 
calm, no peace; my torm ents banish rest” (Job 3: 20-21; 23-26). At the same time 
however as he is com pletely conscious o f  his situation, he fully accepts us 
personal limits and limitations. He acknowledges that he is ‘im perfect’ as a hum an 
being {Job 9: 32-33) and (third characteristic), he knows that he did not in fact 
deserve his suffering because he has never strayed from G od’s way. Job m akes this 
perfectly elear the second time he responds to his ‘ffiends’, when he specifically 
asks them to show him exactly where he had failed: “Have I said to you, ‘Give me 
something, make some present for m e at your own cost, snatch m e ffom the grasp 
o f  an oppressor, ransom  m e from the grip o f  a violent m an’? Put m e ight, and I 
shall say no morę; show me where I have been at fault” {Job 6: 22-24). Job even 
reiterates his innocence some time later to God Himself: “ [Y ]ou know very well 
that I am  innocent.. {Job 10: 7). In fact, almost every tim e he begins to speak, he 
asserts his innocence {Job 13: 18, 23; etc.). So far we can say that Job, iust like 
C am us’s Sisyphus, reasons luud ly  and notes and accepts his proper limits. Further, 
the < haractenstic o f re\ olt is clearly present and easily iaentifiable throughout The 
Book o f  Job. W hile Job continues to hołd on to his belief in God, he outspokenly 
rejects his present conditions {Job 10: 7), even accusing God on certain occasions 
o f  being too harsh, even unfairly severe* 22 {Job 10: 6).
Thus three out o f  the four conditions seem clearly fiilfilled. For the fourth 
characteristic. that is, deprivation o f  all hope but without falling into despair, this
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2) Hugo Van Hooreweghe also holds this view. He writes in the introduction to the Dutch translation 
of Jung s Answer to Job that “Job represents perhaps much morę the man who. ffom his stncken 
existence, revolts than [he doesj the suffering man that tolerates everything that stnkes him” (Van 
Hooreweghe 1998: 7) (my translation).
22 Abraham Joshua Heschel is also of this opinion: “[A]nd Job dares to ąucstion the faimess of the 
Almighty” (Heschel 1955: 268). Another interesting interpretation of whole Book of Job, and 
especially o f Job’s revolt, can be found in the work of the late Italian poet David Maria Turoldo. 
Marco Cardinali, Italian theologian and commentator on Turoldo, staies that for Turoldo, “until 
Job has a family, owns houses, has ffiends and richness, Job doesn’t talk, as if he didn’t e cist. He 
starts existing ffom the moment all is destroyed.... Job starts existing the moment he starts talking, 
and he starts talking when he is completely alone, abandonedby all. F or! uroldo in fact ‘believing 




seems to be present in the same way as in C am us’ text. It is perfectly elear on morę 
than one occasion that Job has given up all hope for his earthly life, crying out, 
“ [W ]here then ism y  hope? W ho can seeany  happiness for me?” (Job 17: 15). But 
here problem s with the com parison creep in: Job has g i\en  up hope, but the hope he 
has given up is merely hope about (t)his earthly life; he has not given up all hope. In 
tact, the m orę that hope about earthly lite is given up, the łiigher rises his hope for a 
better life in the next w orld23. Thus efforts to establish a parallel with Sisyphus 
seem to be in vai~i. I f  Job had not been so conscious o f  his own situation or had 
refused to accept in fuli his own limits, the case m .ght be different but on the issue 
o f  hope, there seems to be a fundamental problem  in drawing a resemblance 
between Job and C am us’ Sisyphus. Indeed, following C am us’ own linę o f  thought, 
we could say that like the existentialists, Job desires to be eured and saved; and this, 
as noted earlier, is (according to Camus) tantam ount to philosophical suicide.
4. God’s intervention
I f  The Book o f  Job ended with Job hoping for etem al salv<tion, this study would 
have come to its conclus-on. In the last chapters o f  the Book, however, God Him self 
enters the seene. First o f  all, God is defm itely not happy with the views expressed 
by Job’s friends. They still firm ly cling to the old tradition which sees all suffering 
as forms o f  punishm ent for the sins m ankind has committed. “Can you recall 
anyone guiltless that perished?” is a question asked by one o f  Job’s friends. \n d  he 
continues, “W here then have the honest been w iped out? I speak from experience: 
those who plough iniąuity and sow disaster, reap ju st that. Under the breath o f  God 
they perish: a blast o f  his anger, and thej- are destroyed.. .” {Job 4: 7-9). Job does 
not agree with this explanation o f  so-called divine jnstice; and God him self 
confirms the correctness o f  Job ’s disagreement, saying, ‘“ I bum  with anger against 
you [Eliphaz o f  Teman] and your two friends, for not having spoken correctly 
about me as m y servant Job has done” ’ (Job 42: 7). But despite this, God is not 
pleased with Job either.
23 According to some interpretations, this hope located in the next world extends to the proclamation 
of the resurrection o f the body. Job 19,26 (“After my awakening, he will set me close to him, and 
from my flesh I shall look on God”), is the verse that most closely approaches this point, from a 
Christian perspective.
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Although G od’s m tervention is rather enigm atic24 25, this paper’s context o f 
considering the redemptive power o f  hum or allows us to offer an interesting 
interpretation which is somewhat divergent from the traditional ones given for His 
dwine words. Job’s refusal to accept that all suffering is a resułt o f  sin clearly does 
not anger God. N or is the source o f  His anger His rejection o f  Job ’s efforts to argue 
with Him  as an equal. Traditional interpretation has claim ed the reason for G od’s 
anger to be strictly an epistemological one, with the fundamental issue being Job ’s 
knowledge (or, morę accurately, Job’s ‘not-know ing’). And in fact God starts His 
first interrogation w ith questions addressing Job’s lack o f  knowledge o f  how: 
“W here were you when I laid the earth’s foundations? Tell me, sińce you are so 
well -informed” (Job 38 :4), and “ [H]ave you any inkhng o f  the extent o f  the earth? 
Tell me all about it if  you have” (Job 38: 18).
Regarding Jo b ’s suffering, the same epistem ological problem  e ris ts  (the 
problem o f  his lim ited knowledge): the fact is, Job did not take his suffering all that 
well. This was because he did not simply accept his suffering for w hat it was and as 
it was; rather he wanted to know why he was suffering. Seemingly, it is this 
‘w hy-question’ that ‘angers’ God; not because He does not have the answer, but 
simply because Job is not in any posm on to ask the question. The answer cannot in 
fact be given to  m ankind (as yet) . Thus to p rovide the answ er to  the 
‘w hy-question’ would efifectively strip Job o f  his hum anity by giving him  access to 
the viewpoint and knowledge o f  God. And without humanity, there w ould be 
neither any possibility o f  his sufferinu, nor any possibility o f  being happy and 
laughing during that suffering.
6. C o n c lu sio n
For Albert Camus, it was o f  fundamental importance that we should im agine the 
tragic hero Sisyphus as being happy, even, as I have added, im agine him  with a 
smile on his face. In certain confrontations, both smali and large, between m an and 
the world that surrounds him, it is often just a little spark that sets in m otion the
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24 As John E. Hartley points out, “Yahweh ignores Job’s complaints and avoids making a direct re- 
sponse to his avowal of innocence, and contrary to the friend’s expectations, he does not reprove 
Job for some wrongdoing” (Hartley 1088:487). Space does not permit deeper examination here of 
different possible interpretations of the passages in which God speaks.




process by w hich we become aware o f  the absurdity o t lt all. The absurd baflfles us 
while it underlines the utterl} unreasonable and inexplicable silence o f  the world 
that surrounds us. The only m eans available to mankind to engage with and 
confront this absurdity is to act like the happy Sis>phus portrayed by Camus, that 
is, consciously to accept oneself and one’s situation while at the same time being in 
active revolt by finding it laughable and expressing that with a smile on one’s face.
O f course The Book ofJob is a text that in some senses is not so much concem ed 
with reflections on hum an pain and sufifering -  it is rather princ lpally concem ed 
with the fact that the fundam entals o f  hum an existence go beyond reason 
(Cardinali 2002: 105). In m ost cases, just as in C am us’ work, these fundamentals 
are therefore very closely linked to the absurd. For a moment it seemed possible to 
imagine Job with a sim ilar smile on his face. But despite the parallel absurdum that 
the two heroes m ust cope with, it tum ed out that trying to imagine a smiling or 
happy Job, sim ilar to C am us’ Sisyphus, was not easy. Job seems to have wanted too 
much and the four essential conditions holding good for C am us’ hero are not so 
rcadily fulfilled by the Biblical character. He wanted to know why he had been 
thrown upon the tender mercies ot the absurd. But G od’s reproval o f  Job pointed 
him  a way out o f  this impasse, whether he took it or not.
N either Sisyphus nor Job are actually reported as laughing in their precarious 
situations. But j ■ ■ st as Camus asked us to try to imagine Sisyphus happy (therefore 
capable o f  laughter), I think it is possible to imagine that Job ought to have been 
happy and laughing in his plight. Such happiness would have redeem ed the pain he 
felt because, ju st as with the laughter o f  Sisyphus, the laughter would have taken on 
a divine ąuality. It is in such moments that m ankind can touch the divine.
B ib lio g rap h y
Alcaeus 1999, Fragments, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Apollodoro 1998, Biblioteca, Milano: Mondadori.
Bergson Henri L., 1911, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comie, I -ondon: Ma- 
cmillan and Co.
Camus A., 1959, The Myth of Sisyphus -  and Other Essays, New \  ork: Vintage Books. 
Cardinali M., 2002, U Dio Inseguito Viaggio alla scoperta della fede nella poesia di 
David Maria Turo Ido, Roma: Edizione Pro Sanctitate. 
dei Bonsignon G., Ovidio Methamorphoseos vulgare. Printed in Venice by Zoane Rosso 
for Lucantonio Zonta on MCCCCLXXXXVII a di X del mese di Aprile, Libro IV, 
Capitolo XXXI, De Sisypho.
2 7 6
Frost R., 2002, A Masąue of Reason. In Lathem Edward Connery, ed., The Poetry oj Ro­
bert Frost: The Collected Poems. New York: Henry Holt.
Gilbert Stephen W., 1996, Etymologies of Humor: Reflections of the Humus Pile, Si- 
ncronla, Winter, (available at: http://sincronia.cucsh.udg.mx/etymolog.htm). 
Hartley J.E., 1988, The Book of Job. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company.
Heschel A.J., 1955, God in Search ofMan -A  Philosophy of Judaism, New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux.
Homer, 2006, The Odyssey, Arlington: Richer Resource Publications.
Igino, 1998, Favole, Lecce: Argo Editore.
JungC.G., 1984, Answer to Job. London: Routledpe, (original edition, Jung, Carl G.,An- 
twoord op Job, Rotterdam: Uitgeverij Lemniscaat, 1998.)
Kast V., 1991. Sisyphus: The Old Stone — A New Wav, A Jungian Approach to Midlife 
Crisis. Einsiedeln: Daimon Verlag.
Morreall J., 1983. Taking Laughter Seriously, Albany: SUNY Press.
Pausania, 2003, Descrizione della Grecia, Milano: Mondadori.
Sophocles, 2003, Tragedie e Frammenti. Filottete, Milano: Mondadori.
Sutherland R., 2004, Putting God on Trial: The Biblical Book ofJob, Trafford: Victoria. 
Teognide, 1989, Elegie, Milano: Rizzoli.
Vanheeswijck G., 1993, Lachen om de wereld. Dwarsliggers in het Europese Denken, 
Kapellen. Pelckmans.
Van Hooreweghe H., 1998, Inleiding. In Jung, Carl Gustav, Antwoord op Job. Rotterdam: 
Uitgeverij Lemniscaat, pp.7-20.
Wharton J.A., 1999, Job. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.
Whedbee W., 1977, The Comedy ofJob. -  Polzin, Robert and Robertson David (eds.) 
“Studies in the Book of Job”, Semeia, 1 (1977), pp. 1-44.
Job: A Christian Sisyphus? H umor and the Triumph o f  Humań Experience
Over the past decades humor and laughter have come to be accepted as serious topics in 
academic research and a number of diverse theories on humor and the role of laughter 
have been developed. These theories, however, consider laughter mainly in its daily 
aspects or in normal life situations. Starting ffom Albert Camus’ concept of the happy 
Sisyphus, this paper considers whether the figurę of Job, who seems to inhabit a 
comparably absurd situation, could also be considered as happy, even laughing. The 
paper concludes with a distinctive reading of the divine words found at the end of The 
Book of Job that ma> be fundamental in linking Sisyphus w.th Job.
Keywords: Sisyphus, Job, Camus, absurd, happiness, laughter.
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